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SOME ASPECTS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY
FRANK J. PARKER f
INTRODUCTION
T ]HE formulation of the classic axiom that "No man should
be twice punished for the same offense" is credited to Sir
Edward Coke, who, among other offices, served as Attorney
General for England beginning in the year 1594. The prin-
ciple was deemed so basic that it was embodied in our
Federal Constitution and in the Constitutions of most of the
states. Thus, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States reads in part: .... . nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb.. ." and the Constitution of the State of New
York contains a similar provision.'
"Jeopardy" generally means exposure to loss or injury
and is synonymous with peril, hazard or risk.' In law,
jeopardy is that status which attaches to a person when he
is put on trial before a court of competent jurisdiction on an
indictment or information, which is sufficient in form or sub-
stance to sustain a conviction, and a jury has been charged
with his deliverance.8 As was said in People ex rel. Totalis
v. Craver,4 "It is the peril in which a prisoner is put when he
is regularly charged with a crime before a tribunal, properly
t United States Attorney for Eastern District of New York.
I N. Y. CoNsT. Art. I, § 6 (1938).
2 People ex rel. Totalis v. Craver, 174 Misc. 325, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 533
(Sup. Ct. 1940).
3Ibid. See 15 AM. JuR. CRImINAL LAW § 359 (1938). In Kepner v.
United States, 195 U. S. 100, 126 (1904), the Court held that the constitu-
tional provision against double jeopardy can have no application unless the
prisoner has theretofore been placed on trial. For example, Justice Brandeis
said in Collins v. Loisel, 262 U. S. 426, 429 (1923), "The preliminary exam-
ination of one arrested on suspicion of a crime is not a trial; and his dis-
charge by the Magistrate upon such examination is not an acquittal .
(People v. Dillon, 197 N.-Y. 254, 256)."
4 174 Misc. 325, 326, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 533, 535 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
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organized and competent to try him." The same thought has
been expressed in somewhat similar language: "... when a
person has been placed on trial on a valid indictment or in-
formation before a court of competent jurisdiction, has been
arraigned, and has pleaded, and a jury has been impaneled
and sworn, he is in jeopardy, but... until these things have
been done, jeopardy does not attach." 5
Prior to 1946 when the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure became effective a defendant presented an objection
on the ground of former jeopardy by a plea in bar.P How-
ever, in the federal courts today, the accused raises the ob-
jection by a motion before trial under Rule 12 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
7
OFFENSE AGAINST Two SOVEREIGNS
Notwithstanding any state or federal constitutional
protections against double jeopardy, it is clear that where an
act offends against the law of both a state and the federal
government both sovereigns may prosecute and punish. This
principle is simple, but, as with many such principles, diffi-
culties arise in its application.
The case of People ex rel. Liss v. Superintendent 8 is an
apt example. A husband and wife were indicted in a federal
district court in Brooklyn, New York, and charged with
violation of the federal narcotics laws.9 Shortly before, the
S 22 C. J. S. § 241 (1940). See McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F. 2d 640, 642
(10th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 610 (1936). The protection secured
by the double jeopardy provision applies to misdemeanors as vell as felonies.
Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (U. S. 1873). See Jarl v. United States, 19 F.
2d 891 (8th Cir. 1927).
6 United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141, 151 (1931) ; United States v.
Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 379 (1922) ; United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 665
(1896) ; Ex parte Nielson, 131 U. S. 176, 177 (1889); Brady v. United States,
24 F. 2d 399, 405 (8th Cir. 1928) ; Gardes v. United States, 87 Fed. 172, 173
(5th Cir. 1898).
7 Subdivision (b) (I) and (II) of Rule 12 is the governing provision.
For a form of motion to dismiss, see Form 19 in the Appendix to the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure. It need merely be stated that the defen-
dant moves that the indictment be dismissed on the ground that the defendant
has been in jeopardy of conviction of the offense charged therein in the case
of U. S. v. ................  in the District Court for the ........................ District
of ........................, Case N o ................. terminated on .....................
8 282 N. Y. 115, 25 N. E. 2d 869 (1940).
943 STAT. 657 (1924), 21 U. S. C. §174 (1946).
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police had discovered a quantity of morphine in their home.
Upon the trial, the husband was convicted, and the wife
acquitted.' 0
After the wife's acquittal, an information was filed
against her in the Court of Special Sessions for the City of
New York, County of Kings, charging violation of the New
York Public Health Law, which made the unauthorized pos-
session of any narcotic drug unlawful. This information
was based upon the possession of the identical narcotics re-
ferred to in the federal indictment. Substantially the same
testimony was offered by the prosecution at the trial of the
information in Special Sessions as was relied upon by the
Federal Government in the former trial, and the wife was
convicted in the state court. However, before she was sen-
tenced by Special Sessions, the wife instituted a habeas
corpus proceeding; the writ was sustained by the New York
Supreme Court at Special Term but dismissed by the Appel-
late Division."
However, the Appellate Division was in turn reversed
by the Court of Appeals.' 2 The state's highest tribunal
pointed out that, while two sovereigns may punish for the
same offense when it is a crime against each, the statute in-
volved in the state prosecution plainly excepted a case where
a person had been convicted or acquitted of the same act or
omission under the federal law. Speaking for the Court,
Judge Loughran said:
"No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense." (N. Y. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 6.) This constitutional
guaranty is invoked by the relator in opposition to the present prose-
cution against her in this state for what she asserts is the same offense
of which she was acquitted in the federal court. She is wrong in
that position. A single act which violates both federal and state
criminal laws is generally held to result in distinct offenses against
the two separated governments. "Each government in determining
what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity is exercising its
10 The conviction was affirmed in United States v. Liss, 105 F. 2d 144 (2d
Cir. 1939).11 People ex rel. Liss v. Superintendent, 257 App. Div. 865, 13 N. Y. S. 2d
787 (2d Dep't 1939).12 People ex rel. Liss v. Superintendent, 282 N. Y. 115, 25 N. E. 2d 869
(1940).
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own sovereignty, not that of the other. It follows that an act de-
nounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an
offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished
by each....
The relator also contends, however, that the present prosecution
against her is outlawed by the very statute which the People say she
transgressed. In this contention we think she is right. . . . Since
the want of jurisdiction of the Court of Special Sessions was apparent
upon the face of the conceded facts, the case was clearly an appro-
priate one for the remedy of habeas corpus.13
Also illustrative of the difficulties encountered in apply-
ing the dual sovereignty principle is Grafton v. United
States.14 There a soldier had been acquitted on a man-
slaughter charge by a general court martial convened in the
Philippine Islands, the crime charged was a violation of the
62d Article of War.' Subsequently, a criminal informa-
tion in the name of the United States was filed in a Philip-
pine court charging him with the same offense committed in
violation of a local law. The United States Supreme Court
held that the acquittal of the accused by the court martial
precluded his again being tried for the same offense in the
civil court, for the reason that he would thus be put twice
in jeopardy of punishment. The 62d Article of War was a
federal statute, and the general court martial was a federal
tribunal. The Philippine Act was a local law, and the
Philippine court of first instance was a local court. But
both of the laws and both of the courts owed their existence
to the same authority. The decision thus rested upon the
ground that the soldier, having been acquitted by the federal
tribunal, could not be subjected to prosecution in any other
court, civil or military, of the same sovereignty.' 6
2Id. at 118-120, 25 N. E. 2d at 870-871. The statute which the court re-
lied upon as forbidding the state prosecution was N. Y. Public Health Law§ 445:
"Effect of acquittal or conviction. under federal narcotic laws
No person shall be prosecuted for a violation of any provision of this
article if such person has been acquitted or convicted under the federal narcotic
laws of the same act or omission which, it is alleged, constitutes a violation
of this article. Added L. 1933, c. 684, eff. July 1, 1933."
14206 U. S. 333 (1907).
25 Now A. W. 96, 41 SiAT. 806 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1568 (1946).
16 It should be noted that the Court grounded its holding not on the double
jeopardy provision of the then A. W. 102 (now in substance A. W. 40,
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During the prohibition period, the problem again came
before the Supreme Court in United States v. Lanza.' It
was there held that conviction and punishment in a state
court under a state law for making, transporting and selling
intoxicating liquors was not a bar to a prosecution in a fed-
eral court under the National Prohibition Law for the same
acts. The Supreme bench stated:
We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different
sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the
same territory. Each may, without interference by the other, enact
laws to secure prohibition, with the limitation that no legislation can
give validity to acts prohibited by the amendment. Each government
in determining what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity
is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.18
It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both
national and state sovereignties is an offense against the
peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each.
CLOSELY RELATED OFFENSES
From a study of the cases, it plainly appears that closely
related offenses are separately punishable without any viola-
tion of the double jeopardy provisions.
In Blockburger v. United States,19 the question before
the United States Supreme Court was whether the same act,
namely the sale of narcotics, constituted two offenses: (1)
that of selling the forbidden drugs except in or from the
original stamped package, and (2) that of selling such drugs
not in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom
the sale was made. It was held that although there was but
41 STAT. 805 [1920], 10 U. S. C. § 1565 [1946]) but on the double jeopardy
provision of the Act of Congress establishing a civil government in the Philip-
pines, 32 STAT. 691, 692 (1902). See opinion of the Court in 206 U. S. at
345 and 355. Also see People v. Wendel, 59 Misc. 354, 112 N. Y. Supp. 301
(Sup. Ct. 1908), which held that the Grafton decision was not applicable to
a court-martial conviction of a national guard officer, but that he still had
to stand trial on a subsequent indictment of grand larceny in the state court.
See Ex parte Benton, 63 F. Supp. 808 (S. D. Cal. 1945).
17 260 U. S. 377 (1922).
is Id. at 382.
19 284 U. S. 299 (1932). See Gavieres v. United States, 220 U. S. 338
(1911), where the Court overruled the double jeopardy plea in prosecutions for
insulting a public official and for disorderly conduct growing out of the fracas.
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one sale, two offenses were committed, and that the test to
be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or
only one is whether conviction for each offense requires proof
of a fact which the other does not.
Mr. Justice Sutherland cited a Massachusetts ruling to
the effect that "A single act may be an offense against two
statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction
under either statute does not exempt the defendant from
prosecution and punishment under the other." 20 Applying
the enunciated test, the Court concluded that, although both
sections were violated by one sale, two' offenses had been
committed.21
The case of Helvering v. Mitchell 22 presents another
interesting factual pattern involving the double jeopardy
safeguard as applied to similar offenses. Mitchell was found
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to have fraud-
ulently deducted in his income tax return an alleged loss of
approximately 3,000,000 for a purported sale of bank stock
to his wife, and to have fraudulently failed to report some
.5666,000 received by him as a distribution from the manage-
ment fund of the National City Bank. The commissioner
notified Mitchell that there was a deficiency in his return of
approximately $728,000 and on account of the fraud the com-
missioner sought a 50% addition thereto in the sum of
,5364,000. A civil action was commenced against Mitchell on
this claim.
Prior to this time Mitchell had been indicted under the
Revenue Act for wilfully attempting to evade or defeat in-
come taxes. He had been tried on the indictment and ac-
quitted on all counts. The first count was based on the
deficiency of $728,000 due to his alleged fraudulent deduc-
tion on the wash sale to his wife and the failure to report
the income from the management fund. The fraud penalty
of .5364,000 was not involved in the indictment.
20 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, 304 (1932).
21 The court also stated that the case of Ballerini v. Aderholt, 44 F. 2d
352 (5th Cir. 1930) was not in harmony with its views and was disapproved.
Sce Morgan v. Devine, 237 U. S. 632 (1915).
22303 U. S. 391 (1938).
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
the prior judgment of acquittal was not a bar to the civil
action under the doctrine of res judicata, and it affirmed the
$728,000 assessment. It held, however, that in the civil suit
the 50% fraud penalty was barred by the prior acquittal in
the criminal action.23
Mitchell petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari to
review so much of the judgment as upheld the assessment of
the deficiency of $728,000 but certiorari was denied on that
point although the commissioner's petition to review the de-
nial of the 50% fraud penalty was granted. In the Supreme
Court, Justice Brandeis observed that Congress imposes
either criminal or civil sanctions to insure honest disclosure
by taxpayers in income tax matters and he pointed out:
Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in
respect to the same act or omission; for the double jeopardy clause
prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to
punish criminally, for the same offense. The question for decision
is thus whether § 293(b) [of the Revenue Act of 1928 (the 50%
fraud penalty)] imposes a criminal sanction.24
The Court held that it did not and that the 50% addition
to the tax was not primarily punitive but rather a remedial
sanction and as such could be imposed by a civil procedure
to which the constitutional guaranties governing the trial of
criminal prosecutions did not apply.25
Similarly, in Albrecht v. United States 26 the double
jeopardy provision of the Constitution was held to be no
barrier to separate sentences for possession and sale of in-
toxicating liquor in violation of the National Prohibition
Act, even though the same liquor was involved, and the de-
fendants could not have sold without having possessed. The
indictment contained a separate count of possession and a
separate count of sale as to each sale made on particular days
to informers who purchased liquor at Albrecht's place of
23 Mitchell v. Commissioner, 89 F. 2d 873 (2d Cir. 1937).
24 303 U. S. at 399.
25 See also Hanby v. Commissioner, 67 F. 2d 125 (4th Cir. 1933), where it
was held that a conviction for filing a false income tax return is no bar to a
civil penalty action. The case is noted in 47 HARv. L. Rav. 1438 (1934).
26273 U. S. 1 (1927).
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business. The defendants contended that the liquor for the
sale of which they had been convicted, was the same liquor
for the possession of which they had been convicted; and as
they could not have sold such liquor without having pos-
sessed it, their conviction of having sold necessarily included
the offense of having possessed. Thus, the defendants in the
Supreme Court argued that the lower court in imposing upon
them separate penalties for the sale and possession had sub-
jected them to double punishment for the possession in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment.
However, the difficulty with the defendants' contentions
lay in the elementary proposition that the power to define
and prescribe the punishment for offenses against the United
States rests with Congress. 7 The Supreme Court rejected
their argument because it found that Congress intended to,
and did, create distinct offenses. The Court held: "There is
nothing in the Constitution which prevents Congress from
punishing separately each step leading to the consummation
of a transaction which it has power to prohibit and punish-
ing also the completed transaction." 28
It is likewise plain that conspiracy to commit an act,
and the commission of the act itself are two distinct offenses
and consequently separately punishable. An example of this
rule is United State8 v. Bayer.29 In that case one of the de-
fendants was an Army officer who had been tried and con-
victed by a court-martial for conduct unbecoming an officer
and for conduct prejudicial to good order and military
discipline and of such a nature as to bring discredit upon
the service. Shortly thereafter all of the defendants were
indicted in a federal district court and subsequently con-
victed on an indictment alleging that the defendant officer
and two other individuals entered into a conspiracy to de-
fraud the United States of its right to the unbiased services
of the defendant officer and that as part of such conspiracy
the two individuals gavethe officer money with intent to in-
fluence his actions.
27See Morgan v. Devine, 237 U. S. 632, 639 (1915); Burton v. United
States, 202 U. S. 344, 377-8 (1906).
28 Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 11 (1927).
29331 U. S. 532 (1947). Cf. Sealfon v. United States, 332 U. S. 575 (1948).
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The Supreme Court held that the military and criminal
offenses were not the same, even though they arose out of the
same facts, and said:
we think the District Court correctly ruled that the two
charges did not accuse of identical offenses. The indictment is for
conspiring and we have but recently reviewed the nature of that
offense. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640. Its essence is
in the agreement or confederation to commit a crime, and that is what
is punishable as a conspiracy, if any overt act is taken in pursuit of
it. The agreement is punishable whether or not the contemplated
crime is consummated. But the same overt acts charged in a con-
spiracy count may also be charged and proved as substantive offenses,
for the agreement to do the act is distinct from the act itself .... In
the court-martial proceedings, Radovich alone was accused. No con-
spiracy was alleged and the specification was confined to Radovich's
receipt of money for effecting transfers. This was a substantive
offense on his part under the, Articles of War. The agreement with
others to commit it constituted a separate offense, although among
the overt acts proved to establish the conspiracy were the same pay-
ments and transfers. Both offenses could be charged and conviction
had on each. The plea in bar was properly overruled. 80
Therefore, it would seem that in determining questions
of double jeopardy, it is not the identity of the evidence ac-
tually adduced to support the charge which is significant;
rather the elements of the offense and the evidence required
to establish those elements furnish the criterion for resolving
the question of identity." Along the same lines is an inter-
esting case 82 where on the first indictment, one Rhinelander,
along with others, was charged with stealing government
pistols. He was acquitted on an instructed verdict. At the
trial it was shown that he was not present at the time the
pistols were stolen from the government armory and did not
in any way participate in the original theft. However, it did
appear that he became a party to the enterprise after the
taking of the pistols. As a result a later indictment was filed
against him charging the offense of receiving and concealing
30 Id. at 532-3.
a' Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640 (1945) ; Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U. S. 299 (1932). See also Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U. S. 365(1901).
32 Ex parte Rhinelander, 11 F. Supp. 298 (W. D. Texas 1935).
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government property with intent to convert the same to his
own use and benefit, knowing that it had been stolen. Rhine-
lander sued out a writ but it was dismissed. The court held
that the two offenses of stealing and receiving were pred-
icated upon different sections of the statute, were entirely
separate in law, and were dependent upon entirely different
facts. It applied the "same or different evidence" test-a
test, which if it discloses a difference, will, as Mr. Justice
Rutledge pointed out in his concurring opinion in District
of Columbia v. Buckley,33 usually show a substantial differ-
ence. Thus, it is perfectly obvious that the evidence which
will sustain a conviction for receiving and concealing stolen
property will not, standing alone, sustain a conviction for
stealing the property. Equally is it manifest that evidence
which might sustain a conviction for stealing the property
would be insufficient to sustain a conviction for the subse-
quent offense of receiving and concealing. The two trans-
actions are separate and distinct.
In the cases which follow, the courts have held that
double jeopardy did not exist and have separately sentenced
the defendant for each offense no matter how closely the
offenses were related and regardless of the fact that they
were occasioned by one act or grew out of one transaction.
One of the latest holdings is United States v. Michener 34
where the defendant was charged in the first count with
causing a plate adapted for counterfeiting government obli-
gations to be made on or about August 25, 1934; and, in the
second count, with the possession of the same plate on or
about that date and thereafter, with intent to use it in
counterfeiting such obligations. The question presented was
whether the defendant might be given consecutive sentences
upon such indictment. In a 4 to 3 per curiam decision the
Supreme Court, citing merely the Blockburger,35 Albrecht,36
3 128 F. 2d 17 (D. C. Cir. 1942).
34 331 U. S. 789, per curiam reversing 157 F. 2d 616 (8th Cir. 1946).
35 See note 19 supra and text thereto.
36 See note 26 supra and text thereto. In King v. United States, 280 U. S.
521 (1929), the Supreme Court, on the authority of the Albrecht case, affirmed
per curiam a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, King
v. United States, 31 F. 2d 17 (1929), holding that a conviction of the offense
of selling morphine, not in or from the stamped package, was not a bar to a
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and Gavieres 11 cases (discussed supra), reversed the Court
of Appeals and upheld the district judge in his action of
sentencing Michener to a term of fifteen years on each count
of the indictment, the sentences to be served consecutively.
There are a multitude of similar instances where the
courts have imposed separate sentences without violating the
Fifth Amendment. By way of example, it has been held that
a defendant was not exposed to double jeopardy where he
was sentenced for agreeing to receive proscribed compensa-
tion and for receiving such compensation; 38 for breaking
into a post office with intent to commit larceny and for com-
mitting the larceny; 39 for cutting each of a number of mail
bags, even though all were cut in the course of one trans-
action; 40 for stealing mail bags and for abstracting their
contents; 41 for unauthorized sales of cocaine to three dif-
ferent persons on different days (as against the contention
that several offenses constituted a single continuous act in-
spired by the same intent); 42 for passing two different
counterfeit notes of the same denomination; 48 for three
murders on the same day, as to two of which the defendant
was acquitted on the ground of insanity; 44 for assaults on
each of two individuals even though they occurred very near
each other in one continuing attempt to defy the law; 45 for
homicide, where the accused had been convicted of assault
and battery before the death of the injured person; 46 and for
making a false entry in the books of a bank, showing a credit,
and later making a false entry in a report of the condition of
the bank, showing the same credit. 47
subsequent prosecution for the offense of shipping morphine in interstate com-
merce, without having registered or paid the special tax, even though the same
morphine was involved in the two cases, the two offenses being perfectly dis-
tinct as a matter of law.
87 See note 19 supra.
38 Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 344 "(1906).3 9 Morgan v. Devine, 237 U. S. 632 (1915).4 0 Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U. S. 625 (1915).
41 Poffenbarger v. United States, 20 F. 2d 42 (8th Cir. 1927).
42United States v. Dougherty, 269 U. S. 360 (1926).
43 United States v. Randenbush, 8 Pet. 288 (U. S. 1834).44 Hotema v. United States, 186 U. S. 413 (1902).
45 Flemister v. United States, 207 U. S. 372 (1907).
46 Diaz v. United States, 223 U. S. 442 (1912).
47 United States v. Adams, 281 U. S. 202 (1930).
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY AS APPLIED TO SITUATIONS TERMINATING
A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
Very often a prosecution comes to an end as a result of
certain circumstances at the trial deemed unfair or prejudi-
cial, and then the question arises whether a retrial of the
defendant would subject him to double jeopardy. The doc-
trine of double jeopardy, as applied in the criminal courts
of the United States, contemplates that these courts have
"... . the authority to discharge a jury from giving any ver-
dict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances
into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act,
or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.
They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and
it is impossible to define all the circumstances which would
render it proper to interfere."1 48 When a jury has been thus
discharged, the defendant may again be tried for the same
offense. This principle has been applied in a variety of cir-
cumstances. Thus, it is not double jeopardy if the first jury
is discharged because of its inability to agree; 49 or because
it appears, in the course of the trial, that a juror is ac-
quainted with the defendant"0 or because one of the petit
jurors was a member of the grand jury which returned the
indictment.51 The same rule has been applied to cases where
the appearance of prejudicial articles in the public press was
thought to make a fair trial impossible; "2 where the trial
judge was of the opinion that his own remarks had been
prejudicial; 11 where a juror appeared to be insane after the
commencement of the trial; 84 where the defendant was not
rearraigned after the overruling of his demurrer to the in-
dictment." Similarly, a retrial after a discharge of the jury
48 United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 580 (U. S. 1824).
49Ibid Keerl v. Montana, 213 U. S. 135 (1909); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187
U. S. 71 (1902) ; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263 (1892).
GOSimmons v. United States, 142 U. S. 148 (1891); United States v.
McCunn, 36 F. 2d 52 (S. D. N. Y. 1929).ZlThompson v. United States, 155 U. S. 271 (1894).52 See United States v. Montgomery, 42 F. 2d 254 (S. D. N. Y. 1930).
5 United States v. Giles, 19 F. Supp. 1009 (W. D. Okla. 1937).5 4 United States v. Haskell, 26 Fed. Cas. 207, No. 15,321 (C. C. E. D.
Pa. 1823).5 Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U. S. 199 (1916); United States v. Riley,
27 Fed. Cas. 810, No. 16,164 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1864).
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because of illness of the judge,56 or of a juror 57 does not pave
the way for a double jeopardy plea, even though the alterna-
tive of a discontinuance of the trial may exist. Nor is a de-
fendant twice put in jeopardy if an indictment is dismissed
and a subsequent grand jury inquires into the same charges
on a resubmission by the District Attorney.58
It is clear that it is vitally important to determine
whether the jury has been discharged for reasons of con-
venience or for reasons of necessity. For, as Mr. Justice
McLean said on circuit long ago:
The discharge of a jury in a criminal case, on the ground of a
necessity which could neither be foreseen nor controlled, imposes no
hardship on the defendant of which he has a right to complain. He,
alike with the government, must submit to the law of necessity,
which, of all other laws, is the most inexorable.59
Therefore, if a case is taken from the jury for reasons
of convenience rather than necessity, the defendant is held
to have once been in jeopardy, and may not be retried.61
Where the prosecutor enters a nolle prosequi because his evi-
dence appears insufficient, a later trial is barred; 61 and the
56 Freeman v. United States, 237 Fed. 815 (2d Cir. 1916).
57 United States v. Potash, 118 F. 2d 54 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313
U. S. 584 (1941).
58 United States v. Rogoff, 163 Fed. 311 (S. D. N. Y. 1908); Simpson v.
United States, 229 Fed. 940 (9th Cir. 1916). The right of the prosecutor to
re-submit is recognized in United States v. Thompson, 251 U. S. 407 (1920).
59 United States v. Shoemaker, 27 Fed. Cas. 1067, 1068, No. 16,279 (C. C.
D. Ill. 1840). The most recent Supreme Court case involving the necessity
principle seems to be Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684 (1949).
60 There have been varying applications of the necessity principle, which
are dependent upon differing views as to when jeopardy theoretically attaches.
See Note, 24 MINN. L. REv. 522, 524 (1940). It is frequently said thatjeopardy attaches as soon as the jury is impaneled and sworn, McCarthy v.
Zerbst, 85 F. 2d 640, 642 (10th Cir. 1936) ; or once evidence is heard, Clawans
v. Rives, 104 F. 2d 240 (D. C. Cir. 1939), and for those courts, a later dis-
continuance of the trial seems to constitute a recognized exception to the pro-
hibition against double jeopardy. However, there are expressions to the effect
that there can be no jeopardy until the verdict, United States v. Watkins, 28
Fed. Cas. No. 16,649 at 479 (C. C. D. C. 1829); United States v. Watkins,
28 Fed. Cas. No. 15,321 at 212 (C. C. D. Pa. 1823); or if the trial failed
other than on the merits, Amrine v. Tines, 131 F. 2d 827, 834 (10th Cir. 1942).
For the courts which take this view, prior discontinuance of a trial for neces-
sity cannot, of course, involve the defendant in jeopardy.
61 Clawans v. Rives, 104 F. 2d 240 (D. C. Cir. 1939). See United States
v. Shoemaker, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,279 at 1068 (C. C. D. Ill. 1840); People
ex rel. Stabile v. Warden, 202 N. Y. 138, 151, 95 N. E. 729, 733 (1911).
Contra: Bassing v. Cady, 208 U. S. 386 (1908), where the finding of an in-
[ VOL. 25
1951 ] SOME ASPECTS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY 201
same is true when he proceeds without having all his wit-
nesses present,62 or where the trial judge withdraws counts
of an indictment from the jury's consideration purely as a
matter of convenience.6 3
If a jury should be discharged for some reason, or the
judgment reversed on some ground not invalidating the in-
dictment, there is nothing to prevent a prosecutor from pro-
curing a new indictment and charging the same offense in a
different manner, and then proceeding on the new rather
than an old indictment. As to this the Supreme Court has
stated:
As the effect of the reversal of the judgment in the former case was
to set aside the judgment of conviction on the first and second counts
of the original indictment, the way was opened for another trial on
those counts. But the Government elected not to proceed under that
indictment, but to have a new one embodying the same charge....
Its right to adopt that course cannot be questioned.6 4
Similarly, the plea will not be sustained where the first trial
was on a fatally defective indictment, or before a court which
had no jurisdiction; 6 or where the jury was discharged at
the defendant's request because of the misconduct of the
United States Attorney.66 And one who upon conviction
takes an appeal and obtains a new trial thereby waives his
defense of double jeopardy, and at his second trial he may be
convicted of an offense of a higher degree than that of which
he was originally convicted.6 7 However, a defendant was
held to have been subjected to double jeopardy, where the
dictment, followed by an arraignment, pleading thereto, repeated continuations
and eventual dismissal at the instance of the prosecuting officer on the ground
that there was not sufficient evidence to hold the accused, was held not to
constitute double jeopardy.
62 Cornero v. United States, 48 F. 2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931).
63 United States v. Kraut, 2 F. Supp. 16 (S. D. N. Y. 1932).
64 Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 344, 380 (1905).
65 Schoener v. Pennsylvania, 207 U. S. 188, 195-6 (1907); United States
v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 669 (1896).
66 Blair v. White, 24 F. 2d 323, 324 (8th Cir. 1928).
67 Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15, 18 (1919); Brantley v. Georgia,
217 U. S. 284 (1910) ; Trono v. United States, 199 U. S. 521 (1905) ; Murphy
v. Massachusetts, 177 U. S. 155, 158-60 (1900); United States v. Ball, 163
U. S. 662, 671-2 (1896); People v. Palmer, 109 N. Y. 413, 17 N. E. 213
(1888), cited with approval in People v. McGrath, 202 N. Y. 445, 96 N. E.
92 (1911). See also Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459,
462, 463 (1946).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
first trial started on Saturday and the court lost jurisdiction
by holding over into Sunday, on which day defendant was
found guilty by a jury and sentenced. The loss of jurisdic-
tion did not change the fact that he had been placed in
jeopardy.68
CONCLUSION
The authorities show that the double jeopardy clause,
like the other clauses of the Fifth Amendment, was designed
to afford an accused a maximum amount of security from
arbitrary or tyrannical acts of government. It was not
meant to serve as a suit of armor which might be indiscrim-
inately used to clothe a wrongdoer and thereby prevent just
and proper punishment for his crime. Thus the double
jeopardy prohibition must be read in the light of judicial
interpretation of its meaning and when so read, it is clear
that an act which offends two sovereigns may be punished by
each; that closely related, though distinct, offenses may be
separately punished; and that above all, the provision may
not be invoked until jeopardy has once truly attached.
68 People ex rel. Meyer v. Warden, 269 N. Y. 426, 199 N. E. 647 (1936).
See 11 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 120 (1936); 5 BRooKLYN L. Rmv. 337 (1936);
5 FoRD. L. REv. 359 (1936); 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 616 (1936).
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